Week+2+-+Cohen+I

My principal concern lies with how well our representative government fulfills the rights that we, as citizens, are suppose to have (despite the possible evils that Rousseau links with representation) under the social contract: a right to participate in politics (number four according to Cohen). Cohen reiterates Rousseau in saying that there must be government accountability. “The people, as sovereign authority, have the right to oversee the administration of the state —that is, the execution of its laws —and to overturn the government’s interpretation of those laws” (138). Furthermore, “it violates the terms of the social contract, and ultimately the fundamental interest in autonomy that the society of the general will secures, for citizens to be put inor to put themselves in a position in which they are unable to assess whether the rules and institutions by which they are governed conform to the common good, or unable to **act** ** to ensure ** that the terms of social association are **consistent** ** with those assessments ** [that conform to the common good]”(147). Cohen argues against Rousseau’s claim that representative government is illegitimate in congruence with an extension of the slavery argument. This reasoning stems from the complex nature of representation in which citizen still maintain rights, unlike slaves. This being said, I realize that our government holds certain standards in order to keep representatives accountable; reelections, impeachment, and so on, but I still wonder if we citizens have an active role in politics (besides voting) or legislation, which as the sovereign, are suppose to embody. To me it seem that the act of voting does not constitute a role in legislation that the social contract requires of us to be the sovereign. It seems to me that our house of representative can again and again pass laws and legislation that do not mirror the general will. If all we can do is not reelect those who do not follow the general will, it seems we do not retain the right “to overturn the government’s interpretation of those laws” as the sovereign should. Does our current governing body not deny us of our fourth right as citizens in the social contract? Does this not violate the terms of a social contract and therefore void it?
 * __Week 2 - Cohen I__**
 * Cody Witko:**


 * Afton Carlson.** Cohen writes, "The requirements of generality of rules needs, then, to be supplemented by requirements of equality of wealth and power. For if groups are relatively equal in power, and if resources are widely distributed, then it is difficult to design policies that predictably deliver particularized benefits and generalized costs. By thus reducing temptations and providing assurance, such arrangements permit public deliberation to proceed in terms of considerations of the common good." If such a system were to be enacted, it would run counter to the fundamental tenets of capitalism. This type of general economic equality, being a necessary condition, in both Rousseau's political philosophy, and Cohen's interpretation of the same, in order to insure that the general will prevails, suggests that our economic model is unable to support the free society envisioned in the Social Contract. Wealth disparity in the United States has grown exponentially in the last three decades, with ten percent of the population controlling over eighty-per-cent of the country's wealth. Our country is immersed in severe economic inequality; the checks that need to be in place in order for the general will to hold sway are absent. According to Rousseau's political philosophy, in such an environment, private interest rules.


 * Susan Thomas**. Cohen, on page 136 under the sub-section "Direct Democracy", states, "...the laws must be made in a legislative assembly open to all citizens, or by representatives to a legislative assembly who are elected, subject to frequent review, and given specific and binding instructions by citizen assemblies." This section is meant to explain Rousseau's requirements for representatives. However, Rousseau also said, (Social Contract, III.15), "...the moment a people gives itself representatives, it is no longer free; it no longer exists." How do these two uses of the word 'representative' square with one another? Furthermore, in light of our modern system of representation, how do we measure up? Do our representatives truly represent us or only their own individual interests? What would Rousseau say about our system? Are we still a free people? If, as was touched on in class, Rousseau was talking about a much smaller state/body than the US, as pertains to this issue, is there a way to apply the Rousseau type of organization to something the size of the US? If so, with or without representatives?

‘‘A free people obeys, but it does not serve; it has leaders and not masters; it obeys the Laws, but it obeys only the Laws." but if there are people putting laws in place as policy makers then how do the people they represent know/are made aware of all the rules of the policy, and how is a person truly living a free and right filled life if they are being made to obey laws that they fully might not understand. It seems to me that in a representative democracy you can't have the freedoms guaranteed by public rule, because even though you have a vote in who represents you you can never, as an outsider, be fully aware that their actions are in the public's best interest.
 * Brian Malone:** In chapter five of his text on Rousseau's Social Contract, Cohen brings up the topic that the Public Rules, "is implicit in the idea that the laws come only from the people, who in making them, know them." I.E. that people need to understand the law before they vote on it and put into place, but he quotes Rousseau on laws, "


 * Aly Lamar** - I enjoy Cohen's elaboration of Rousseau's views on legislative and executive power while incorporating the social background of rights and associations. I have not been able to resolve, however, what appears to me to be a dichotomy between the general will and how Rousseau sees the transfer of that will to the legislative power(s). Cohen states that according to Rousseau, "…the sovereign will cannot be represented by lawmakers because legislative representation would assign to the legislators the responsibility for determining the content of the will, with the result that the people would have no will of its own" //(p. 149).// Conversely, Cohen later clarifies, "He [Rousseau] defends the right of legislative assemblies to determine their own agenda, and come to their own views about public issues," further pointing out that to not allow them to do so, according to Rousseau, would be "contrary to all reason" //(p 171).// Is the first reference a //better// //expression// of the general will? Is the latter referring to a state of government already established after the creation of the general will and therefore held to different expectations of representation through expression?


 * Bryce Blankenship:** I have found it interesting, with recent coverage on the primary process that the candidates routinely use the phrase, or a variation of it: “I have spoken with the people of America and they want such-and-such.” Or, “I know that Americans want, or desire this and that, or are tired of this and that….” That these candidates, along with all candidates and politicians //reflect// the thoughts and views of Americans…Our country prides itself on being a representational form of government. In theory this, I think, might be the case—in practicality however, it is more of a dream. Routinely voices are not heard, votes are not accepted, and representatives do not reflect a populous. The representatives reflect and adhere the dollars that help put them in their positions of power. Representatives make laws and policies that make it difficult to even be represented in the first place—i.e. voter I.D laws. I don’t know who my ‘representative’ is, or better yet, what their actual job is, because it certainly is not one of being represented. In the chapter for today’s reading, a paragraph on page 136 begins with the sentence “The importance of //public// rules is implicit in the idea that the laws come only from the people, who in making them, know them.” In our ‘representative’ form of government I give the authority to ‘the powers that be’ to decide the rules—or laws—which I am to follow. Often is the case that the laws that I have given permission to, in virtue of being ‘represented,’ do not reflect what //I// actually desire or think. How can a representational government, such as ours, accurately adhere to the thoughts, beliefs, ideas, and desires of a major populous? ‘Representation’ seems to be a misguided and deceptive word to imply that we are in a fair and democratic state. We are not. There is a system in place that keeps winding and hinging on movements put forth from decades, even centuries passed. How are we truly represented when we know not what the laws are or what they mean? And, if we no not what the laws are or what they entail, then why is the government able to punish us for not knowing the laws? Ought it be the job of our //representative// to relay to us, the common people, what the laws and policies they are enacting (on our behalf) and not be able to punish us for simply ‘not knowing?’


 * Ben Gearheard**

Does Rousseau grant us limited free speech?

Cohen says on page 139 under the heading “Rights of Assembly” that “Citizens have a right to assemble, and in their assembly have a right to discuss public issues. Even ‘in the most absolute Governments assemblies of communities that are not presided over by any Magistrate are permitted’ (LM 270). This right of assembly and discussion may seem to conflict with Rousseau’s proposal that in arriving at political decisions citizens should deliberate with ‘no communication among themselves’ (SC 2.3.3.) Cohen in the rest of this paragraph defends Rousseau’s proposal that citizens should keep from talking among themselves about legislation as being most concerned about the danger of “division of the population into a few organized factions”. Does it make a difference whether these private discussions occur during the legislative assembly or outside of the legislative assembly? Does this proposal to limit private discussion go too far? Cohen does not clearly identify a right to free speech as a basic right on his list on pages 146 to 147. But, isn’t it a right to a free, morally culpable being, free of original sin and in fact naturally good, capable of empathy, as Rousseau suggests we are, to be able to speak freely on matters of political opinion with whoever will listen, and if so, are we to believe that this right is surrendered when forming the social pact, for our own protection?

**Tim Johnson:** Personally, I found myself most interested in the twin assertions that, first, "simple majorities should be decisive only in the case of 'deliberations which have to be concluded straightaway.' It is both legitimate and reasonable to require support from qualified majorities in order to legislate on 'more important and serious' issues," and second that "legislative decisions should take place after the people is well informed" (137). The second is interesting given that it touches of necessity on the notion of a free press; it seems that in order for the people to be well informed, they must have free access to the information which it is the responsibility of a free press to provide. On the other hand, Rousseau does not seem to directly advocate a free press as such; rather, at least from my own understanding, the citizenry appears to be expected to become informed largely through their own sources of information instead of relying on intermediaries. One wonders which role that wikileaks fills, an independent source of information, or an intermediary? The first assertion interests me largely in relation to crisis decisions; one assumes that an immediate state-threatening crisis is an "important and serious" issue, and yet no body, however filled with brilliant, foresightful people can forsee //all// possible crises. If an unforeseen decision is necessary within hours, if not minutes, is it practical to require the assent of a "qualified majority?" Or would Rousseau suggest that emergency procedures must be put in place by the legislature in advance of crisis?

My first concern with this work, found in the following quote, is the lack of definitions both Rousseau and Cohen provide for a free community of equals. //"// // If what Rousseau says is right, then a free community of equals is difficult to achieve, hard to sustain, but not an unrealistic ideal." // Martha Nussbaum brings up the core issue of the social contract theory as 'equality' in the theorists' views as adult males with roughly the same physical and mental powers. Her question with this problem is what are we to do in the case of Women's physical disability compared to Men and other people with serious mental and physical disabilities (children and seniors included). My question then is what are we to do in the face of these disabilities in interpreting the social contract and does this view align with the conservative view that all Americans should be producers and we should get rid of the maternal entitlement system of welfare, food stamps etc.? Is there an easy way to re-interpret the social contract to talk about fairness and fostering everyone’s unique capacities so they can flourish? Or are we to confine equality to a Paternalistic system of able-bodied adult males?
 * Matthew Baughman:**

My second question in regards to the reading has to do with democracy and how we celebrate its legitimacy. //"This conflation is, Habermas argues, common to a variety of normative theories of democracy, and has ‘‘con- fused the discussion of democracy right up to this day.’’ The confusion Habermas is here pointing to is the claim that the idea of consensual political legitimacy leads immediately to a participatory conception of democracy, in which citizens must directly, in person and all together, embrace the laws to which they are subject."// If we are to conceive the idea of consenting to a direct vote of affirmation then we might end up with something like democracy. My worry here is the only form of democracy we conceive is of a majority or super majority in the United States. What about the minorities that do not consent, aren't we always to have issue with the fact that they have not consented to a certain law? Faced with our personal interest on every level wouldn't we have to completely unite our self-interests in a system of consenting democracy?
 * Emily McCormick**

Cohen writes on page 144, “Finally, Rousseau’s psychology is not reductionist. Rather (taking the Particular Interest and Priority Conditions together), the motivations of citizens have a structure in which reasons of the common good are supposed to take precedence over reasons of particular interest in public contexts: practical reasoning has a structure that is not captured by preference intensities.” Although I can follow Rousseau’s definition of the common good, this passage caused me to think twice about what a will would lose if particular interests were ignored. When using the term “particular interests” are both Rousseau and Cohen referring to concepts and ideas that groups would want to promote within the general population? Or are they referring to individuals committing an offense against the common good that has to be dealt with particularly by the government? Often positive amendments and new laws have been instated after particular interests have been more closely dealt with by the government even though they initially upset the public peace, like civil rights issues for example. What would Rousseau say about those particular interests that lead to improvements for the general public?

There were many interesting ideas that Cohen brought up in this chapter that made me question the validity of ‘American Democracy’ and what the real state of Democracy is meant to be. 1) “The importance of //public// rules in implicit in the idea that the laws come only from the people, who in making them, know them” (136). This idea already seems to be at fault in our government. There seem to be infinite amounts of rules/laws and sub rules/laws, etc, that the average citizen has no clue about. Is this a lack of personal priority to be involved in a democratic government or a failure of the democratic government in involving people in the process of creating and maintaining laws. 2) “Laws must be made in a legislative assembly open to all citizens… or by representatives to a legislative assembly who are //elected//, subject to //frequent review//, and given //specific and binding instructions by// citizen assemblies” (136). While we do have elective representatives who are subject to frequent review, I feel like if citizen assemblies are giving them specific and binding instructions, they are not consistently being followed. It seems that the election process is often a series of decent candidates who are voted for by citizens who don’t necessarily fully support any of them. I know that I’ve never fully supported any candidate that I’ve voted for. Usually I vote for the one who I think is, or has the potential to be, closest to my ideal candidate. Since the candidates are not tailored to individual public desires, many people even choose not to vote at all. This completely detracts from the notion that laws are created by all citizens. Does a democracy require all citizens to participate? Or does it merely require the options to be given for all citizens to participate? 3) “This second alternative (direct democracy)… is a strategy suited to large states, where ‘the legislative power cannot show itself as such, and can only act by delegation’” (136). This quote brings to mind the question of how a democracy functions in different sized states. Can a state be too large to have a functional democracy? Has the USA reached a point of population and differences that it is no longer a properly functional democracy? To what extent was the USA ever a functional democracy? Would it be better to focus more on states over nation-wide politics? Would states secede from the USA as a whole and create smaller sub-nations with more common political and social interests? Would that be a better alternative than trying to subject an entire nation to one set of laws?
 * Beth Ropski**

On page 137, Cohen writes in outlining Rousseau's points, "Legislative decisions should take place after the people is well informed". There are many things wrong with the American form of government, but this strikes me as one of the most significant. First, it is very clear that the general public as a whole is not well informed. Even when voting numbers are low, it is clear that voters are not fully informed. This is likely due to increased complexity in governmental structure and activities, along with increase in daily complexity in terms of individual lives and society. Add on top of this the fact that there are millions of people in the US and we have a significant set of challenges facing us in terms of educating the public. Secondly, the phrasing of the quote makes it unclear whose job it is to educate the public. If the people are uninformed, which they mostly are, legislation is not supposed to happen, yet we base laws frequently. Is the government, the elected officials, responsible for going around and educating the people or vice versa or neither?
 * Jordan Howser**

In Cohen’s paper, and in Rousseau’s own, much attention was giving to the idea of a direct democracy. Though Cohen wanted to get away from viewing direct democracy as a necessity, he still said enough about the subject, and the participatory requirement to democracy that it still brought up an important question in my mind. On page 132, when referring to Rousseau, Cohen states, “… - with a specific claim about how popular consent is to be institutionally organized, in particular with the view that citizens must actually consent in person to the rules of their association”, or as Rousseau more bluntly put it, “Any law which the People have not ratified in person is null” (Social Contract 3.15.5). So my question is, with such in emphasis on the participation. What would either of these men have to say about law made by those who lived long ago without the consent of any living citizen? If participation is required, does a rightful system of laws need to be deconstructed and rebuilt with every generation?
 * Travis Dawson**

Cohen quotes Rousseau, on page 163, as saying: “there is no liberty without laws, nor where someone is above the laws. . . . A free people obeys, but it does not serve; it has leaders and not masters; it obeys the laws, but it obeys only the laws and it is from the force of the laws that it does not obey men” (LM 261, 237). Rousseau is strongly committed to it being the laws that we are accountable to. In America today, where but a few lawmakers seem to be concerned with the common good, are we to be subject to the laws in the same way? Obviously we see this play out in civil rights struggles. Rousseau also writes, that “Liberty consists less in doing one’s will than in not being subject to someone else’s” as Cohen points out on pg. 163 (LM 260-1). When the law is not an extension of the general will, but is rather an extensions of a corporate or private will, are we still to be subject to it?
 * Brendan O'Donnell:**

After reading some of the other questions, I have realized that my question is somewhat related to Jordan’s, but on page 136, the concept of a direct democracy is discussed. It says that: “laws must be made in a legislative assembly open to all citizens, or by representatives to a legislative assembly who are elected, subject to frequent review, and given specific and binding instructions by citizen assemblies.” Although he does include the possible necessity of an elected legislative assembly due to the potential size of a state, but I wonder how this would work in modern society, for example in America. As it is currently in the United States, many people do not vote in the presidential election, which is the most publically publicized. In state elections, the turnout is even less. My question is then: is this problem in America with people simply not bothering to inform themselves of the issues that face the country come from the way that our government is set up, e.g., a two party system and a very large population, or is it because Rousseau’s ideal of a direct democracy one that is impossible in terms of the United States or any similar modern society.
 * Tyler Morrison**

Cohen writes “Rousseau in fact defends a regime in which political initiative is concentrated in the hands of a largely self-sustaining political elite that not only administers the state, but also sets the political agenda and monopolizes the legislative process in all but its final stage.” Is this inevitable for all democratic forms of government? When the general will is bound, whether to tradition, outside values, or a constitution, is this always a shadow looming over the future for that State? If, as it seems, legislative powers are to fall into this, and the people become apathetic to it, what else can exist as a check against the formation of an oligarchy?
 * Randall Gunn ** :


 * Ryan Braun **

While a certain measure of material inequality ‘‘can have its advantages’’ (LD 115), inequalities of wealth and power among citizens must be limited so that no one is required to ‘‘sell himself’’ in order to secure basic necessities. Thus, everyone should ‘‘have something’’ and no one should have ‘‘too much of anything’’ (SC 1.9.8 n., 2.11.2; PE 19; LM 300).8

Are not the vast majority of Americans today forced to sell themselves? There are essentially two classes of people in our nation: the wealthy and powerful (shareholders, business owners, and CEOs) and the wage-slaves (everyone else). Those in the second group are forced to trade their bodies, minds, and time for money (which is then taxed despite the fact that working in exchange for a wage or salary is supposed to be a fair and even trade of hours for currency and result in zero profit for the worker) in order to procure basic necessities. The fruits of their labor are harvested by a small elite. I have no issues with rewarding hard work, but can anyone deny that the ultimate goal of American culture is to live a life of leisure free from work? I have the greatest contempt for those who prize a life free of work, as the only way to obtain such a life is through the exploitation of others (or inheriting the fortune of someone who exploited others). It is clear that Rousseau would be disgusted by the America of today for many reasons – would this passage be one of them? Is my account of the wage-slave accurate?