Week+4+-+Meikeljohn+I

__**Week 4 - Meikeljohn I.**__


 * Afton Carlson:** On page 18, Meikeljohn writes, "No one can doubt that, in any well-governed society, the legislature has both the right and the duty to prohibit certain forms of speech... Words which incite men to crime are themselves criminal and must be dealt with as such." Also, on page 48, he writes, "If [the First Amendment] means anything, it means that certain substantive evils, which, in principle, Congress has a right to prevent, must be endured if the only way of avoiding them is by the abridging of that freedom of speech upon which the entire structure of our free institutions rests." Our government has argued that the people it apprehends (often without due process) are inciting people to commit terrorist acts and/or planning terrorist acts. But the precedence they have set to apprehend these individuals (the Patriot Act and detainment without due process), clearly infringe upon the First Amendment and are an example of what governments shouldn't do in Meikeljohn's second point. My question is two fold. Where do we draw the line between an act that "incites men to crime" and an act that is merely a speech act? Meikeljohn himself agrees that most speech is tied up in action, and so should not be prohibited. Does a criminal activity actually have to occur for the speech act itself to be criminal? Also, should the government ever resort to infringement of the First Amendment in order to "protect" its citizens? I'm with Meikeljohn on this one, and our current situation looks grim on this front.


 * Cody Witko:** “To be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for self-government.” (27) “We Americans are not afraid of ideas, of any idea, if only we can have a fair chance to think about it… only an emergency can justify suppression.” (54) In an emergency… there can be no assurance that all ideas will be fairly and adequately presented… When such a civil or military emergency comes upon us, the processes of public discussion have broken down… no advocate of the freedom of speech, could deny the right and the duty of the government to declare that public discussion must be… stopped until the order necessary for fruitful discussion has been restored” (55). This statement, I feel, expresses the conclusion of discerning the clear interpretation of when our freedom (not liberty, as he makes that distinction) can be suspended. My question supposes that these emergencies, so sever that people cannot peacefully convene to discuss ideas, have been created by the allowance of enthusiastic discussion of dangerous ideas leading to this said chaos. Should there not be some middle ground found between “clear and present danger” and these states of emergencies that mutes freedom of speech in order to halt these emergencies? Granted I understand we are not trying to stunt freedom of Ideas however enthusiastic, so I suppose many of the speeches, actions, or ideas that may lead to these cases of emergencies may initially be found as criminal and stopped under that circumstance. Perhaps the damage of property is less of an evil than the loss of our freedom of ideas and speech, but what about when that damage extends to the loss of lives.


 * Susan Thomas:** On pages 54 and 55 Mr. Meikeljohn discusses Mr. Brandeis's explanatory and revisionist statements regarding "clear and present" dangers and what he terms an "emergency" as understood when speech suppression can be tolerated. On the bottom of page 54 it reads, "It is a situation in which there is 'no opportunity for full discussion,' in which there is no 'time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education.' Never when the ordinariy civil processes of discussion and education are available, says Mr. Brandeis, will the Constitution tolerate the resort to suppression." Although Meikeljohn seems to be happy with this new understanding, I still find it unsatisfactory due to its ambiguousness. In what situation would there by "no time" to discuss or expose differing attitudes? Was this merely a stipulation they allowed at a time when information was not as quickly and readily available as it is today? Does this stipulation no longer apply today? It still sounds as though he is willing to tolerate, for rather strange reasons, the suppression of free speech. Is he? And, in what way does this apply to the case of the men who opposed the draft? It seems, given this revision, they should not have been convicted and that their rights were still trampled. Is this correct?

In terms of rebellion, Meiklejohn states: If the government, as an institution, has broken down, if the basic agreement has collapsed, then both the right and the duty of rebellion are thrust upon the individual citizens. In that chaotic and desperate situation, they must, for the sake of a new order, revolt and destroy, as the American colonies in 1776 revolted and destroyed.” In the beginning of the chapter, he states that public policy should be decided upon by “corporate action” and that these actions must be equally binding for all citizens, whether or not they agree with them. It seems to me that he is saying that the majority is the body that makes the laws, which leads to the betterment of the general will. In relation to the American Revolution, the colonists were not the majority when the population of Great Britain as a whole is taken into account. Also, they were citizens of Britain, so they should have been subject to the laws of the time. Were the colonists justified to revolt because of the form of government of the time, or because there were enough people mistreated (the colonist) by their government that they could unite in a rebellion. If the latter is true, then wouldn’t a radical political faction be justified to revolt in modern day America. Even if one percent of American joined this faction, the numbers would be around 3 million, which would represent far more voices of disdain towards the government than were present in the American Revolution, although the proportions are different. I’m wondering if there is any relation to the number of unhappy citizens vs. purely a proportion of citizens—the majority—that justifies revolt?
 * Tyler Morrison:**

Alexander Meiklejohn writes, “The final aim of the meeting is the voting of wise decisions. The voters, therefore, must be made as wise as possible. The welfare of the community requires that those who decide issues shall understand them. They must know what they are voting about. And this, in turn, requires that so far as time allowes, all facts and interests relevant to the problem shall be fully and fairly presented to the meeting.” (p.25) Meiklejohn does not think that the first amendment allows speech whenever, wherever, however. He is arguing that there are two different freedoms of speech, but what exactly are they? Is it freedom of belief on the one hand, and freedom to participate in orderly public discussion on the other? Meiklejohn’s use of the American town meeting as an example of self-government in action is intended to show that the first amendment does not cover “out of order” speech. He seems to be in line with Rousseau in that a well-functioning democracy requires an educated populace, and from that premise supports that all relevant ideas must be heard; yet, Meiklejohn holds that speech which is out of order must be suppressed to get business done. Further, he says ”Anyone who would thus irresponsibly interrupt the activities of a lecture, a hospital … does not thereby exhibit his freedom. Rather, he shows himself to be a boor, a public nuisance, who must be abated, by force if necessary.” (p.24) But is that the case? Even if it becomes apparent that the person who interrupts a meeting is a “boor,” does it follow that this person must be forcibly restrained? Meiklejohn might argue that the person should just wait their turn to freely speak, because they do not have freedom to interrupt, only freedom to participate, which means following the rules of order. But, who gets to decide those rules of order? In a democracy I’ll assume that the majority decides, but does that decision trump the minority’s right to speak? Or does the original social compact itself limit that right, when people give up their rights to the general will?
 * Ben Gearheard**

I am beginning to believe that ‘freedom of speech’ is not as free as what we have been led to believe it being. “Freedom,” which has yet to be definitively defined, is an illusive and seductive word that is often used to describe some deep, human longing. We all //know// what freedom is, what it looks like, and that there is the desire for more of it. However, if //freedom// is dictated by a governing body, such as that as the Legislature, with parameters and guidelines, then is the //freedom// actually //free?// In section two of chapter 1, Meiklejohn had an interesting take on the //freedom// that we have. “What, then, is this compact or agreement which underlies any plan for political freedom? It cannot be understood unless we distinguish sharply and persistently between the “submission” of a slave and the “consent” of a free citizen. In both cases it is agreed that obedience shall be required. Even when despotism is so extreme as to be practically indistinguishable from enslavement, a sort of pseudo consent is given by the subjects” (10). I think these are interesting questions, which seemingly point to the idea of, in some way, we are slaves to the government. Did this enslavement occur upon being born here? And what if I don’t want my //freedom// being hoisted and dictated by the government? I digress. Sorry. Going back to my initial sentence: I am beginning to believe that ‘ freedom of speech’ is not as free as what I have been led to believe it being. The //freedom// that we have come to associate with the speech is that which is dictated by the rulers, and what the ruling party deem. We are enslaved, in a way, to what we can and can’t say. And we have seen this with Wikileaks. The fact that information was exposed and released, that may have //endangered// the United States shows that that speech was not as free as perhaps thought.
 * Bryce Blankenship:**


 * __Emily McCormick__** In Chapter 2, Meiklejohn gets met thinking about the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court justices are appointed by the President, which we, the people, elected. When the Supreme Court rules on a topic we are to abide by it because it is what we’ve accepted as the most accurate interpretation of the law. According to Meiklejohn, “But it is equally true, and perhaps more important, to say that the law is what the Supreme Court, more or less successfully, is trying to say. Or, even better, the law is what the court ought to say” (pg. 35). It seems strange to me that we trust the justices as being an integral part of our democratic government. Why would we choose to be governed by the rulings of people who were //appointed// by someone other than ourselves? Doesn't that directly violate the rules of democracy, or even a representative democracy? Wouldn’t the only way to be truly democratic in every aspect of the government is to elect all officials who have control over implementation or interpretation of laws that govern us? Why is the Supreme Court different, why do we trust those appointments?

"...a free government, established by common consent, may and often must use force in compelling citizens to obey laws. Every government, as such, must have external power. It must, in fact, be more powerful than any one of its citizens, than any group of them. Political freedom does not mean freedom from control. It means self-control... At the bottom of every plan of self-government is a basic agreement, in which all the citizens have joined, that all matters of public policy shall be decided by corporate action, that such decisions shall be equally binding on all citizens, whether they agree with them or not, and that, if need be, they shall, by due legal procedure, be enforced upon anyone who refuses to conform to them" (8-9).
 * Beth Ropski:**

This really makes me question the idea of freedom in the US. Freedom is defined as "the power or right to act, speak, or think as one wants without hindrance or restraint". Meiklejohn writes that 'political freedom' is different from 'freedom'. In political freedom, one must give up certain rights to conform to the whole. This is an agreement that we are each born into. In consenting to this agreement, we are each molded into supporting (happily or not) the majority of the citizens in the US. This seems to bring up the obvious issue of minorities and a lack of voice. Is there a way that laws can be changed to give the minority a louder voice? Do we even want the minority to have a louder voice? Would it change anything if their voice was louder? How far do the boundaries of political freedom need to be pushed before there is a revolt? Is there a type of government or any changes that could be made to ours to allow more freedom? or are we too big of a nation to cut slack on laws already in place? Do we focus on enforcing the necessary laws? What laws are necessary to have a functional nation?

__**Brian Malone:** __ Mr. Meiklejohn discusses the special ability to usurp true free speech, and that ability is called “Clear and Present Danger.” A Clear and Present Danger is when something that someone says is so hazardous to the country or running of the country that the government must step in and censor the person to keep the safety of the country at the forefront. I am both in approval and against the ability; for I can understand a censoring of a person trying to release troop movements online or on TV but I don’t like the idea that it can be used to censor a person’s opinion that is in opposition to the government; as was the reason for forming it to stop people speaking out about draft policies in WWI. I think that the idea of freedom of speech is the most important thing we have but if one violates another person in such a way that puts them in danger then the violator must be censored. i want to know if i am the only one who feels that way, that if you abuse your right then you must at least loose it for a wile.

**Tim Johnson**  Meiklejohn writes, "The constitutional status of a merchant advertising his wares, of a paid lobbyist fighting for the advantage of his client, is utterly different from that of a citizen who is planning for the general welfare" (39). My reading of Meiklejohn suggests to me that, on his view, the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment applies to citizens in their role as active participants in government. This implies to me a certain view of the Citizens United case: that a corporation ought not be viewed as a citizen because a corporation does not exercise the franchise. In other words, if it doesn't cast a ballot, it can't be a citizen. Then, too, I suspect that even if a corporation were to be granted notional citizenship, it STILL ought not be granted the right of free speech in the case of a political campaign unless it clearly identified itself and spoke for itself. It seems that Meiklejohn does not believe that paid representatives are allowed to speak freely and "not be questioned in any other place." Do I have this correct? And what does this mean for political ads generally? Is a simple "Citizens to elect the soul-sucking leech of the week" sufficient identification? Or does the Constitution require a higher standard?

“He [Plato] demands of us that we make it for ourselves. But that there is a distinction and that the understanding of it is essential for the practice of freedom, he asserts passionately and without equivocation. If the government attempts to limit the freedom of a man's opinions, he tells us, that man and his fellows with him, has both the right and the duty of disobedience. But if, on the other hand, by regular legal procedure, his life of his property are required of him, he must submit; he must let them go willingly.” Meiklejohn uses two of Plato's dialogues as the basis for reason in how the Framers' mindset was during the drafting of the constitution. He says that the suppression of opinions by the government is unjust and demands disobedience, but he then argues that the lawful prosecution must be met willingly. His argument stems from the idea that by the nature of self-government, laws are passed and enforced by political and legal equals, so to keep the idea of self-government constant, a trespasser must submit to the ruling of his peers lest the government fail. I think that the Framers, if and when they see a scene similar to this take place, they would argue that the protection of human liberty it paramount to protect. Is Meiklejohn actually saying that the continuation of the state is more important than the protection of the liberties of those who make the state?
 * Randall Gunn**:

On page 53, Meiklejohn points out Chief Justice Holmes’s great quote, clarifying the “clear and present danger” condition: “To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for free discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” This quote is great, but it relies on a few things I am skeptical about. What if there is no confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government? Today, reason is derided as elitist and business interests drive the propaganda to further divorce reason from the public debate. We see this with climate change denials and the reluctance to do much of anything about that issue politically. I guess I’m just skeptical that reason ever actually wins the day.
 * Brendan O'Donnell**

Meiklejohn said, "These conflicting views may be expressed, must be expressed, not because they are valid, but because they are relevant" (27). I have noticed the apparent contradiction in the first amendment and am shocked to discover that despite my constant education until now, none of my educators could explain the distinction to me between that speech which is relevant and therefore free from censorship and that speech which is irrelevant and not givent he same freedom. Is it right of me to summarize the distinction in this way? My concern with this if true is the same issue that appears in any distinction like this: the gray area in the middle. In a public assembly in which the main concern is food production during the cold war, is it relevant to promote communism and communal farming? In that discussion I imagine that the proponent of communism would be attacking the economic system at large and not just the issue of food production. And next, how does this apply to situations which there is no clear relevant topic? If I go on the street corner and proclaim my feelings on various offensive topics, how does one determine relevance?
 * Jordan Howser:**

"They impressed upon their readers ""the right to assert your opposition to the draft,"" and urged the draftees to exercise that right. The Supreme Court unanimously sustained the conviction and Mr. Holmes wrote the opinion. In doing so, he formulated a new test of freedom of speech guarantee." Considering wiki-leaks and the type of information deemed secret, isn't there a huge moral hazard in censorship in Clear & Present Danger? How do terms like terrorism expand this to an international scope? Are we seeing a subversive effect in our policy in the middle that the wikileaks issue & Bradley Manning’s trial? Considering our alliance with Israel, and the hundreds of UN sanctions they have broke shouldn’t we at least be skeptical of our roles in the Middle East and now Asia. The fact Iran has completely given into all UN inspections and the assassinations of their nuclear scientists why do we still not investigate Israel? The mainstream media censors it when people try and break controversial stories. An example is when CBS fired a journalist who tried to break the story on George W. Bush deserting the National Guard to stay out of Vietnam and how he had his father (Governor of Texas at the time) cover up the fact. This is especially interesting when the incumbent Presidents main attack on Kerry was that he went missing for a few days in Vietnam. Why is there an ideological censorship in our culture and can we use any of these justifications to explain this phenomenon or is it just a coincidence?
 * Matthew Baughman: **

**Aly Lamar:** While I agree with the overall tone and points of the first two chapters of Alexander Meiklejohn's //Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government//, I still find myself unable to discern the "correct" interpretation by the courts of libelous assertions for or by "the general welfare" and the "the common good" in relation to their "ideas" vs. their "speech" vs "speech...sometimes more than an expression of thought...a form of action" (p. 41) For example: Meiklejohn explains, "No one can doubt that, in any well governed society, the legislature has both the right and the duty to prohibit certain forms of speech. Libelous assertions may be, and must be forbidden and punished". He further continues that in certain cases, "decisive repressive action by the government is imperative for the sake of the general welfare." (p. 18)

Say that the above-mentioned “form of speech” is my promotion of communism –certainly able to be interpreted as slanderous speech against the general welfare in a free and democratic society. However I am reading Meiklejohn here as saying the government still has the duty to prohibit this type of speech. At the bottom of page 27 Meiklejohn summarizes that, “Any such suppression of ideas about the common good, the First Amendment condemns with its absolute disapproval. The freedom of ideas shall not be abridged.” Could my promotion of communism be seen as an idea about the common good? My interpretation of these two explanations is that it could be - in which case Meiklejohn simultaneously sees it's the government's duty to prohibit my speech and that the government suppression of my speech is to be condemned. Could you take time to explain this literal difference, that through the overall reading seems to not be as prevalent?


 * Ryan Braun **

"To be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for self-government." (27)

When I was in high school, there seemed to be some sort of tacit understanding regarding what it meant for something or someone to be 'American' that I was unaware of. I still see that sort of blind obedience to specific political ideologies all over the place, but at least it's much more varied these days. On a college campus, people blindly follow all sorts of different leaders instead of just one.

Wikileaks represents the idea that the governments of the world and the people who run them are to be subject to suspicion, and that they need to be held accountable for the decisions they make both in public and behind closed doors. I imagine that idea is terrifying to many of those currently wielding the power of law in the United States who abuse that power for personal and factional gain.

There is an interesting paradox in the American thought process reagarding government. On the one hand, the government is thought of as inefficient and cold machine that constantly cuts corners (“Good enough for government work!”), but, at the same time, people will vehemently defend the system of government at its core, insisting that all we need is honest people in office and all will be fixed. Is it really so treasonous to entertain the idea that the system we currently have in place simply isn't working?

“We Americans are not afraid of ideas, of any idea, if only we can have a fair chance to think about it.”

When it comes to freedom of speech and the First Amendment, is it possible to find the perfect line to indicate when something becomes a true emergency for the purpose of suspending the First Amendment itself and suppressing speech (as Cody Witko seems eager to find)? Has anything disseminated by Wikileaks definitively crossed that line (nebulous as it is)?