Week+9+-+Sorial+and+Gilmore

__**Week 9 - Sorial and Gilmore.**__


 * Brendan O'Donnell:** Sorial, on page 298 says, “Speech acts that recommend or command the commission of a crime, as spoken by an authoritative figure such as a religious cleric, are different to speech acts spoken by a non-authoritative figure that encourage someone to commit a crime. The difference is that the authoritative figure’s speech acts creates a significant obligation on the part of the addressee to commit the crime in question.” This is her justification for maintaining laws of seditious libel against speech calling for violence by religious clerics. Sorial focuses on religious leaders’ speech acts as instances of speech from authoritative figures. I wonder what roles count as authoritative. As Gilmore points out, “the holding of certain beliefs, commitments, and desires may carry an obligation to express them.” Therefore, even in absence of religious duty, it doesn’t take much for somebody to take as authoritative the speech of, for example, Glenn Beck or Rush Limbaugh, and be called to action because of fancying him or herself a “true conservative” or some such thing. Or maybe that’s not realistic enough, so what about pro-life activism, which has frequently crossed the line into what could reasonably be called terrorism, with clinic bombings and doctor assassinations? Somebody identifies as pro-life, and as a soldier of God, or some such thing, and is called to violent action to “stop the murders of babies”. I guess my question is, does the authoritative requirement on speech extend past religious lines? If pro-life terrorism is too tied with religion, what about eco-terrorism? I wonder if all public figures can be considered authoritative in some sense. Some atheists trust Hitchens and Dawkins, some leftist intellectuals admire Chomsky, some conservatives listen religiously to Glenn Beck and Rush Limbaugh. Does their public figure status confer authority on their speech? Obviously they're in the public sphere because of what they think and write and say, and so maybe this wouldn't apply to, say, baseball players or musicians or reality tv stars.

In section two of his piece, Gilmore writes, “expression…as a phenomenon in which the articulation of the belief is part of the process in and by which it is constituted, then we can see how the freedom of expression can be founded on the recognition of intrinsic value in the act of expressing: a value that the speaker has in forming his or her ideas and knowing his or her own mind.” I thought that both pieces that we read for today were quite interestingly intuitive. The notion that when we express certain things, verbally, written, or via our actions of our expressions are reflections of what we value. In the case of Wikileaks and Bradley Manning, it can be argued that Manning was expressing an ‘intrinsic value….that was shaped in forming his ideas and knowing in his own mind.’ Assumingly, Manning valued openness, honesty, and the need for more transparency. The act of him releasing the information that he did as a form of expression alludes to the act being intrinsically valuable. As Gilmore also notes later in his essay, quoting Lionel Trilling, “ ‘//Hamlet// is not merely the product of Shakespeare’s thought, it is the very instrument of his thought.’” Similarly the actions that we exhibit: physical, verbal, perhaps even non-verbal are expressions of our thoughts. Some of these expressions are not merely the product of our thought, but instruments of thought. This can be, and is problematic in some instances. For instance, Fred Phelps and his followers express their thoughts in various mediums. They protest, run a defamatory website, and are routinely vocal about their views. And they are free to express these views. Given what has been said about expression though, are these views, which most //reasonable// people find detestable, forms of something intrinsically valuable? Can it be that views that are morally reprehensible, such as Phelps’, are in some way intrinsically valuable on the basis of him and his followers expressing such views? We run into an uncomfortable problem. And for the sake of consistency, I err on the side, although his views and many others I find detestable, are in some way valuable of the basis of being expressed. I would rather allow for views of all to be expressed rather than a suppression of expression all together. (I think). I still don’t like feeling uncomfortable with allowing folks like Phelps to express their views though……dang.
 * Bryce Blankenship**

In part 2 of his paper Gilmore states, “… expression occurs when the content of a given mental state is given a publicly accessible form with the intention that others be able to recognize that mental state from its manifestation. The intended audience may not be any particular person: It may be people in general, God, posterity, even oneself addressed from an external point of view.” It is that last part of that quote that I wish to focus on and where I think he kills his own paper. Gilmore states that for an expression to occur others must be able to recognize the thought behind the utterance. Gilmore also notes that one may be one’s own audience. This makes me think that the person is getting nothing out of being the speaker but rather benefits from always being a part of one’s audience. In Gilmore’s “everyone should be equal” example the speaker refines his or her own belief after hearing it out loud – the job of an audience. Wouldn’t Gilmore’s arguments be more effective if instead of challenging past theories on freedom of speech based on audience intention he embraces and instead argued that a speaker has an innate duel role as both a speaker and an audience member?
 * Travis Dawson**

In Sorial's paper (298-300), she references "authoritative figure(s)," particularly "authoritative religious figures" as the source of "words (that) are significantly obligation-enacting" (298). She even goes so far as to say flat out that she is "not concerned with speech that advocates revolution" (288). Perhaps I failed to read closely enough, but I failed to find any definition of an 'authoritative figure' that did not involve an attendant assumption that such authority was based solely in religion, and that that grounding was the foundation for the significant enaction of obligations. This view is, to my mind, excessively narrow, even given that the purpose of Sorial's paper was to elucidate anti-sedition laws in the context of the war on terror. From what I gathered, Sorial aimed solely at a particular: defining as seditious speech acts by radical religious (read: Islamic) clerics that COULD be interpreted as inciting or supporting terrorist acts. To me, her project is in error if for no other reason that there was not even a gesture at other figures in positions of authority. Our old friend Rush, for instance, being implicated in the attack on Representative Giffords, or Henry II and his "meddlesome priest," or even those darn dirty commies (particularly Comrade Lenin) urging support for a global revolution. Each of these men, for one reason or another, possess a form of authority that is at best merely peripherally religiously grounded; ought not their speech acts be subject to the same regulation if they aim at the same end as an 'authoritative religious figure?' Of course, I am unsure if mere 'authority' is enough to merit regulation of speech in the first place; do we not allow our elected officials to say virtually anything they wish without regard to the veracity of their claims, as long as they are not being directly and falsely libelous? I suspect it is easy enough to guess where I fall on THAT question...
 * Tim Johnson**

On page 287 of the first article, Sorial says, "Any coherent defence of free speech must entertain the possiblitity that there is no clear separation between ideas in the abstract and the impact of such ideas in the world. If there is no definitive separation between the words and the impact they have, as both Scanlon and Barendt conced, then i remains unclear why speech should be considered so special as to be worthy of protection, even when it causes harms of various kinds; harms that if brought about by other means would be considered unjust and legitimately preventable by governmental intervention." Sorial does a sufficient job defending this claim by later discussing the importance of the context in which something is said and by whom, specifically by a person of authority. However, I can't help but wonder if there is something President Obama could say in any context that would only be an abstract thought without intent to cause action. It seems like Obama could say "Peanut butter and jelly sandwiches taste good," and could be interpreted merely as a harmless opinion, couldn't it? If after further investigation and discovery we find that it is not a cryptic message or a command to a special few, etc, wouldn't that prove Sorial's claim false? How much would Obama's opinion about PB&J sandwiches impact the world? Can you state an opinion free of intent? Further, I don't think stating intentionless opinions makes that speech less meaningful either.
 * Emily McCormick**

Sarah Sorial writes (page 296): "...Cohen notes that under the Smith Act and the seditious conspiracy law in the United States, the government has enormous power to attack religious beliefs." And, later in the same paragraph: "...the use of the sedition charge may impair religious freedom more than it protects national security." While I like how Sorial cuts a clean swathe between the types of speech she targets in her paper as unworthy of protection (verdictive and exercitive) under certain, specific conditions, she raises an interesting point here about the tug-of-war this issue creates between our desire to maintain religious liberty and our desire to protect our national security. Even assuming Sorial's position is perfectly accurate and correct, if legislators and litigators in issues surrounding possible religiously motivated terrorist speech and activity are not very careful to only prosecute under these conditions, might we encounter the danger of labeling? For example, just because some Muslims involve themselves in terrorism because they believe Alah wants them to, this does not necessarily entail that everyone who bears the "Muslim" label is interested or even prone to the same sorts of activites. Another example might be within Christianity. The label "Christian" is exceedingly loose. People who categorically disagree with one another on even the most basic tenets and doctrines of what it means to be a Christian still together comprise the group "Christians". Protestants, Catholics, Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, Christian Scientists, and a variety of lesser known cults will all, at one time or another, refer to themselves as "Christian". So, you might have one group (of possibly no more than 2 or 3 people) bombing an abortion clinic and say something stupid like, "I did it because I'm a Christian." Of course, the word "Christian" literrally means "follower of Christ" (Christ = Jesus) but Jesus said things like, "Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you." (Matthew 5:44). So, my question is, at what point, in dealing with religiously motivated acts of terror, do we cross the line Sorial is trying to draw and end up labeling all religions as 'radical' or anyone who believes in a deity of any sort as prone to terrorism? At what point does the label "Muslim" or "Christian" make me liable for any stupid thing anyone who also carries that label does or claims to believe? How far can we trust our government and the lawyers to pay careful attention to Sorial's definitions and conditions (assuming they are correct)? Does the philosophy we develop on paper actually make it to the courtroom?
 * Susan Thomas **

Gilmore states that: “ Here, realization is not the re-presentation of an existing thing in a different form, but the emergence of the thing itself. In this sense expression refers not to the public manifestation of a pre-existing intentional state but the creation or emergence of the intentional state in its expression.” Later on he states that: “…but that the process of such expression is a kind of achievement, one in which one may fail – for lack of the appropriate terms, lack of reflection, lack of exchange with others, and so on.” In saying this, he is making the point that through expression, we gain insight into our own beliefs and opinions. Without this, one can fail to fully “realize” what their beliefs and opinions really are. In articulating what you believe, you discover what you believe. This is an aspect of free speech that he argues is neglected in the structures and arguments for establishing a freedom of speech. One thing that I wonder in appealing to Rousseau is, in Rousseau’s work, he responds negatively to the idea of open and often discussion between members for fear of the influence that one party may have on another—the ideas of some can be overpowered by the ideas of other. I think that Rousseau has a valid point here in that, if your beliefs are not, or potentially cannot, be fully established without their expression, isn’t it possible that //your// personal beliefs could easy just become the beliefs of someone else in an attempt to express you own. I have in mind a scenario of someone who is potentially less informed or less intelligent than somebody whom they express their belief with. It seems as though the more intelligent and informed person could and would simply instill his/her own beliefs into the person in which they were supposed to be functioning as a facility in which the beliefs of the other person could be expressed and therefore fully realized and established. It seems like such a scenario could be problematic and actually diminish the less intelligent and informed person’s freedom of speech or beliefs.
 * Tyler Morrison: **


 * Ben Gearheard**

Gilmore writes “Audiences and third parties do have an interest in knowing that an individual’s expression of her beliefs or values is genuine, and no coerced, but that interest seems secondary compared to the individual speaker’s interest in the free exercise of conscience.” (p.9) Sorial confronts this objection to limit on speech with her argument from context and illocutionary force on page 301: “Given the above discussion about the function of a cleric, the nature of the relationship between the cleric and his congregants, and the illocutionary force of his speech acts, I suggest that regulation of these speech acts would be defensible (in principle)…“

Does Sorial’s argument assume that the interests of the third party are not in fact secondary to the interests of the individual, as Gilmore seems to think? Does Sorial’s argument on p.301 really undermine the argument from autonomy, as she says on p.300? I see that Sorial goes along with Scanlon, dividing expression into two forms: providing reason and providing means; and by using the concept of context to justify responsibility of the speaker, says no more about the individual interest. The argument seems to require a causal link between the originator and the actor. Is the context provided by her example from a cleric to an adherent in a society against Islam sufficient to provide that causal link? What would Hume say about that…

Tim brings up a good point- Sorial’s argument to regulate speech seems to generalize to much more than just the extremist cleric she intends to submit to regulation. If the conditions of a illocutionary force, and an enabling context to amplify it, criminality of the action resulting, and it’s clear that a causal chain exists between the originator and that result, then is that general enough to prosecute someone other than the ‘terrorist’ for sedition? And is that good or bad… or neither?

In reading Sorial on page 280 she gives her reasoning for what sedition laws were for, “Sedition laws are thus intended to target religious zealots who advocate the overthrow of the elected Government by way of violent jihad. They are intended to capture speech that would incite violence, threaten the public interest and provoke hostility between groups within the community.” But if we look to the case Meiklejohn proposed earlier this semester in //__Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government__// about the man who led the KKK rally and proposed to take on and bring down Washington D.C. we as a class came to the same conclustion as the courts that he had his freedom of speech and was not seditious because he was not at the gates so to speak. This man was a zealot and his group, the KKK, backed a certain sect of Christianity, therefore they were to an extent a religious minded group led by a religious leader. Now if we were to use Sorial’s intentions of what seditious laws would this KKK leader fit in with the religious leaders she is saying are the targets of the said seditious laws. The answer is a sorounding yes but being that in the past we let the KKK leader off would we not let these religious leaders off? It is not like their pulpits are on the lawns by the gates to the White House, are they? So can we ever put judgment on the religious/zealotous leaders as Sorial says the laws exist for?
 * Brian Malone**

Kristopher Kinzler I was thinking along the same lines as Brendan O’donnell in wondering whether or not somebody with a cultish following like Limbaugh, could be held liable for making verdictive claims about the world that people then believe. All Limbaugh has to do is make one offhanded, exercitive remark about how he “recommends” someone ought to kill so-and-so in order for the world to be a better place. It would take one of his followers, who took him at his word, to take that as a call to action, and in Sorial’s view, Limbaugh is at fault for, “To the extent that Rahman’s [Limbaugh’s] words describe, judge or characterize all ‘infedels’ [liberals] as ‘evil,’ they are verdictive; to the extent that they command, recommend or order acts of violence, they are exercitive.” (297) Now, I don’t agree that Limbaugh could be held responsible for someone taking him at his word and committing a crime or, that, based on these qualifications, the cleric, Rahman, could be held responsible for his influence. I think that there needs to be another qualification present in assessing the relationship between the speaker and the hearer. I’ll give a quote by Sorial that I think sums up her stance on what qualifies as an illocutionary speech act, explain what I think is missing, and then I’ll be done. “Recall that the success of an illocutionary speech act depends on the speaker’s intention and the audience’s recognition of that intention. The success of verdictive and exercitive speech acts have the further requirement that the speaker have the requisite authority over the domain in question.” (296-7) I think what’s missing is a direct and personal connection between the speaker and the hearer, so that, once the hearer decides to take action she can come back to the original speaker and reveal her intentions for violence. If the speaker really has authority over the situation than they could evaluate the seriousness of the situation and say “yes, do that,” or, “What the fuck? Chill out, man, I wasn’t serious.” Sorial barely hints at the speaker needing to understand the brevity of the speech on pg. 302 where she says, "[authoritative speaker] could foresee the harm occurring, moral and legal responsibility might be imposed."

It was interesting to learn about the Smith Act explained as the criminal offense of "willfully advocating the overthrowing the government of the United" (279). While I am not up on my Mark Twain readings, I do recall excerpts that could be considered seditious libel based on this definition. I appreciate so Sorial's attempt to draw the line between harmful expressions and harmful actions as a result of those expressions. In order for something to be an expression, according to Gilmore, others must be able to know the thought behind the words. This concept parallels nicely with Sorial's defense that the relation between the "speech content" and the “goal it intends to foster” are very closely related. I am curious how Sorial comes to define terrorist speech or government criticisms as "acts of expression" whereas hateful religious speech she considers unique (also in its intended consequences) in that cannot “fall under the protection of the free speech principle” and wonder how her conclusion based on criminal actions can be so confidently drawn to these authoritative sources.
 * Aly Lamar**

Beth Ropski: “I argue that while all speech acts are conduct in a narrow sense, not all of them have the power to produce effects or to initiate a set of consequences. For a speech act to have this effect, two conditions need to be met: the speaker has to occupy a certain position of authority, and the words that are uttered by that speaker have to occur in a particular context (what I will refer to as an enabling context).” (276)

I struggle with the idea of sedition in relation to a speech act unaccompanied by a physical action. Sorial writes that the speaker must (1) be in a position of power/authority, and (2) have to speak in an ‘enabling’ context. I don’t necessarily see how these two conditions change the two previously stated arguments (‘too broad & too narrow’). I believe that people should be allowed to say whatever they wish to say. This might come from an overly expectant idea of the general population’s intelligence and moral background though. To me, it seems that if a person were to stand out in a crowded area and start yelling about how they hate the government, want to bomb the White House, and are looking for people to join their movement, the general public would not respond positively. If they do respond positively, then I would imagine that there is a large fault in the government (and while violence should never be advocated) other measures should be taken to fix this situation. People should have the right to express (verbally or textually) their personal opinions. If there is evidence found that leads to the conclusion that a violent act is resulting from a person’s speech act (such as the person who was yelling about bombs has their house searched and bomb making materials were found), then that person should be put under trial for, not their speech act, but for the intent to harm other citizens’ lives. Until a physical action is made (or evidence leading toward a physical action is found) though, people should be allowed to speak freely on whatever topic they wish.

On page 284, Sorial points out one potential reason for not wanting to restrict the freedom of speech to call for extremist views and the downfall of the state, "Second, there is the additional danger that if extreme speech is not tolerated, it will be driven underground and we will not have the opportunity of countering it through argument and deliberation". Immediately this brought to mind the controversy over drug prohibitions and the challenges such actions have. Prohibition of alcohol and pot both serve as examples of what happens when you drive undesirable things out of the legal and acceptable sphere. In the case of drugs, it creates a black market and criminal syndicates. It creates inaccurate and incomplete discussions of the substance and attempts to sweep it under the rug. Sedition is different in so far as that, if the calls for jihad are pushed out of the public forums and made illegal, it becomes unmonitored and it hurts the public just like drugs; however, when legal it still operates underground, much more so than one would expect from alcohol or pot. I mostly agree that the forum of free and public debate will weed out these extreme positons. The problem with this is the fact that people are very impressionable and sometimes ignorant.
 * Jordan Howser:**

“The act fails or ! misfires " if all the aforementioned procedures are not followed, even though I have the necessary intention. If,   for example, the words ! I do " are uttered in a different context (if for example, I flippantly utter them in the course of a casual  conversation with my partner), then my words will not have the illocutionary force of an act, despite my intention. The speech act will also fail if I am already married or if the person marrying me did not have the requisite authority to do so. In  considering infelicities, Austin has thus demonstrated that we   can critically assess illocutionary utterances by appealing to the circumstances that must exist for them to be happy. Austin develops five categories for classifying illocutionary”
 * Randall Gunn**:

I have a few questions from what Sorial says here on page 19. First, I question the fact that the words in this case are a complete thought. Any speech act in the context of religion preforming a “seditious” act which will usually be in the form of a complete thought, as it is hard for me to come up with any religious or speech in that context which would not be a complete thought when taken into question; I see it as having an locutionary value which would be purposed towards inciting anger or a seditious act, regardless of the words themselves illocutionary. An example would be saying “we should applaud the 19 who gave their lives on 9/11 against America.” The context of the words being said forces them into a locutionary value, and at least would demand a reactionary value of agreement and desire for further action. I am asking in the short of it on the idea of context warping any words when spoken by an authority figure, simply should they be allowed to say any words, regarless if they are even used in a completely locutionary value, if they incite a reaction from the people who would listen to them?

__**Ryan Braun**__

<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">In note 23 on page 282 of her paper, Sorial says that

“<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[In the UK] it would be an oﬀence to celebrate an act of terrorism occurring more than 20 years before publication, only if the publication relates to conduct or events which have been speciﬁed by the Home Secretary for this purpose. The implications of this are that the government can prohibit the gloriﬁcation of terrorism in Cyprus in the 1950s or the Mau-Mau atrocities in Kenya, but in the absence of any speciﬁcation, can permit the celebration of the Dublin Easter Rising of 1916, **making the government the judge of acceptable history**.”

<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">Why does Sorial pick these specific events in making this point? In all three of these situations, Great Britain is something of a bad guy – an oppressive and militant force that denies independence and, in the case of the Dublin Easter Rising, executes those in charge. This example aims to do a lot of work toward presenting the potential dangers of loosely-defined sedition laws, but I doubt these three events were chosen haphazardly. What about them makes them prime targets for discussion?

<span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">Gilmore says - "Tolerance, although certainly to the advantage of those toward whom it is directed, is similarly justified with reference to the public interest: the goal of shaping a tolerant society, one that allows ‘the independent communication of willing speakers and audiences en- gaged in discussion central to the formation of values’. 9 That such tolerance might offer a benefit to those who engage in the protected expression is only derived from the primary benefits accruing to the public good. Thus, arguments against the censorship of hate speech or the like do not typically appeal to how well such freedom serves the interests of the bigoted speaker.10" <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">If we advance the claim that the main goal of freedom of speech is for self-realisation then on a very basic metaphysical level there is a sense which hate speech is denied. Because this type of speech in the market place of ideas denies certain groups from self-realisation, it is not free speech but hate speech, a different type of thing altogether. If speech has the goal of self-realisation, and an utterance does not advance that then by consequence it is not speech. My worry here is that on an abstract level it may seem clear that these are two different categories but what entails hate speech in reality? <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;"> Consider the recent case of Cherie Buckner-Webb, Idaho's only African-American State Congress-woman, who was sent a KKK subscription letter. There is an implication of hate speech here but if we consider Gilmore's framework it could easily correspond as relevant speech. As he also says " Nor can theories of free expression based on audience or third-party interests explain why largely self-regarding forms of expression – e.g., those generated by a desire to instantiate or endorse a form of life or a given identity – would be protected" <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">In this case could be dangerous but it could be argued that it does promote self-realisation. The historical significance and implications of her being the only receiver make it a real threat that has been taken action against this lifestyle endorsement. Is there an intrinsic problem to be found here or are people making much about nothing?
 * <span style="font-family: Calibri,sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">Matthew Baughman: **